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ABSTRACT 
Thomas Pogge proposes the Health Impact Fund (HIF) as a realistic, feasible reform to 
the pharmaceutical patent regime that would incentivize pharmaceutical research and reward 
innovation for medicines based on their impact on the global burden of disease. Pogge advances 
a human rights-based argument to show that the HIF is a morally required addition to the current 
pharmaceutical patent regime. One objection to his human rights argument comes from a 
libertarian appeal to property rights. Pogge’s response to the libertarian leads to the 
counterintuitive conclusion that libertarianism is incompatible with any system of intellectual 
property rights. This paper will show how Pogge fails to distinguish between what I call status 
quo and revisionist libertarian positions on intellectual property. Making this distinction, I 
maintain, would strengthen the human rights argument and allow Pogge to avoid the 
counterintuitive conclusion of his response to the libertarian.    
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Over the past twenty years, there has been a substantial decrease in deaths worldwide 
caused by communicable diseases. Despite this progress, millions still die every year from 
preventable diseases like tuberculosis and malaria, which primarily affect people living in poor 
countries. The situation for the global poor is dire: “Half the world’s population lives in countries 
that cannot afford annual per capita health expenditures of more than $15, and many people do 
not have access to even basic drugs” (Benatar 646). According to the Global Burden of Disease 
Study 2010, tuberculosis killed 1.2 million people in 2010, and malaria caused 1.17 million 
deaths in the same year (IHME). Approximately 8.8 million children under the age of five died 
in 2008; 1.5 million of those deaths were preventable with vaccination (WHO). In an attempt to 
explain why the global burden of disease (GBD) falls mainly on the world’s poor, many people 
point to local factors such as inadequate health infrastructure and the corruption of government 
officials in poor countries. However, it is important not to overlook global factors that contribute 
to the world’s poor receiving the lion’s share of the GBD, chief among them being the 
international laws governing pharmaceutical patents.  
Thomas Pogge maintains that the current international pharmaceutical patent regime is 
unjust because it violates the human rights of the global poor by denying them secure access to 
medicines necessary for their health and survival. Pogge proposes the Health Impact Fund (HIF) 
as an addendum to the status quo that would help secure the basic human rights of the world’s 
poor. To achieve this goal, the Health Impact Fund would offer pharmaceutical corporations the 
opportunity to register their medicines with the HIF, instead of applying for a traditional patent. 
HIF-registered medicines would receive payments based on their impact on the global burden of 
disease, which would encourage pharmaceutical corporations to research and develop medicines 
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that would primarily benefit the global poor. Given the option of supplementing the current 
pharmaceutical patent regime with the HIF, Pogge argues that it is morally impermissible to 
maintain the status quo.  
Pogge anticipates three responses to his human rights-based argument. This paper will 
focus on Pogge’s argument against the libertarian. The libertarian, according to Pogge, would 
defend the status quo by appealing to the natural property rights of pharmaceutical companies. In 
response, Pogge critiques the libertarian by arguing that intellectual property rights are 
inconsistent with libertarianism. However, this conclusion is counterintuitive and, for many 
libertarians, unsettling. In this essay, I show that Pogge fails to distinguish between two types of 
libertarian—status quo and revisionist—and that this distinction is necessary if Pogge wants to 
avoid the counterintuitive conclusion of his response to the libertarian.  
Section II will briefly explain what the Health Impact Fund is, how it would work as an 
addition to the status quo, and why Pogge thinks it is preferable to alternative institutional 
reforms. Section III provides a summary of Pogge’s human rights-based argument in support of 
the HIF. Section IV explains the libertarian’s appeal to property rights as an objection to the 
human rights argument. Section V examines Pogge’s response to the libertarian. Section VI 
locates the flaw in Pogge’s argument with his failure to distinguish between status quo and 
revisionist libertarians. Finally, section VII anticipates two objections against my position.  
 
II. THE HEALTH IMPACT FUND 
 The Health Impact Fund is not intended to completely replace the current system of 
intellectual property. Rather, the HIF would supplement the current system by providing 
pharmaceutical innovators with an alternative to conventional patents. According to this model, 
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“innovators could opt to register any newly patented medicine with the HIF, which would 
provide a guaranteed payment stream in proportion to the incremental impact of the innovative 
drug on GBD during its first 10-12 years on the market” (Ravvin 119). Establishing the HIF as a 
global institution could be accomplished by a coalition of affluent countries. Pogge estimates that 
“If governments representing one-third of global income agreed to contribute just 0.03 percent of 
their gross national incomes ($3 of every $10,000), the HIF could get started with $6 billion 
annually” (AHR 547). The reward payments, which would be distributed annually among 
innovators with HIF-registered products, would be funded primarily by affluent taxpayers in 
developed countries.  
As Pogge explains, “Registrants would be rewarded not for selling their products, but for 
making them effective toward improving global health” (AHR 546). One way of measuring the 
impact on the global burden of disease is in terms of quality-adjusted life years (QALYs), which 
account for both the length and quality of human lives. Some insurance companies and national 
health systems already use this metric, meaning that the HIF should be able to adopt it with little 
difficulty. Under the HIF model, “The rate paid per QALY would be automatically determined 
through a division of the fund proportionally according to the number of QALYs gained by each 
drug registered with the HIF” (Ravvin 120). So the greater the impact of an innovation on the 
GBD, the more its innovator stands to gain from HIF rewards. Although measuring the QALYs 
added by a particular innovation would “necessarily be rough,” the measurements would become 
more precise over time (AHR 547).  
Pogge identifies three important consequences of creating the Health Impact Fund. First, 
the HIF would provide pharmaceutical innovators with incentives to develop medicines for 
diseases that largely affect the poor, but which are unprofitable to research and develop under the 
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current system. Pharmaceutical innovators would see the potential for profit in so-called 
“neglected diseases,” and this new market would overlap with the health needs of the world’s 
poor. Second, medicines registered with the HIF would be available at prices that the global poor 
can actually afford, unlike most medicines with traditional patents, which are sold at extremely 
high mark-ups in order to maximize profits and recoup money from research and development. 
In order to have the greatest impact on GBD possible, and thus maximize HIF reward payments, 
pharmaceutical innovators will have incentive to sell many of their products at prices below the 
lowest cost, which would increase the access of the global poor to essential medicines (AHR 
549).  
Finally, the Health Impact Fund offers a solution to the last mile problem, which is “the 
problem that effective drugs for the developing world often do not reach those who are in need 
of them and/or are not administered in a manner that maximize their impact on the disease 
burden” (ID 416). As Thomas Faunce explains, since innovators would strive to maximize the 
impact of their HIF-registered products on the GBD, they would “seek to ensure their medicine 
had maximum health impact through promoting the construction or improvement of healthcare 
systems to ensure that patients have the knowledge and motivation to use the medicines to 
optimal effect” (149). Although other reform plans promise to spur pharmaceutical innovation, 
few are able to incentivize direct improvements to poor country healthcare systems and 
infrastructure.  
    
III. POGGE’S HUMAN RIGHTS ARGUMENT 
 Pogge’s human rights argument is divided into two stages. In the first stage, Pogge adopts 
a human rights standard as a way to assess the justice of the status quo. He recognizes the 
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difficulty of showing the injustice of the current pharmaceutical patent regime without assuming 
that there is international agreement on a conception of global justice. The human rights standard 
addresses this difficulty, since the moral significance of human rights is widely acknowledged 
across nations and cultures. Human rights are minimal requirements, and Pogge is careful not to 
endorse the view that, so long as an action does not violate human rights, it is morally 
permissible. Rather, he maintains that “anything that does violate human rights is therefore 
impermissible” (AHR 552).  
 Human rights are generally understood as entailing certain duties, the content of which 
varies depending on how human rights are conceived. So-called positive duties to actively 
protect against human rights violations and to work towards realizing human rights are 
controversial and, as Pogge observes, likely to be rejected by many people in affluent countries. 
Pogge’s human rights argument works with human rights narrowly conceived, “where the only 
duties these rights entail are duties to respect, that is, duties not actively to violate human rights” 
(AHR 553). Although Pogge himself does not understand human rights according to this narrow 
conception, his human rights argument follows this understanding so as to reach the broadest 
audience possible.  
 Pogge’s conception of human rights is institutional, meaning that human rights should be 
understood, “primarily as claims on coercive social institutions and secondarily as claims against 
those who uphold such institutions” (WPHR 51).1 On this narrow conception, human rights act as 
constraints on the actions of organized collective agents, such as governments or corporations, 
which prevent them from treating human beings in certain ways. Human rights violations may 
                                               
1
 In contrast to an interactional understanding of human rights, which places constraints on the treatment of human 
beings without assuming social institutions exist. Pogge is particularly concerned with the constraints human rights 
place on governments. 
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involve direct action on the part of collective agents. For instance, a government might imprison 
and torture political dissidents, or silence a nosy journalist by threatening to harm her family. “In 
other cases,” Pogge explains, “human-rights violating treatment is built into social rules, as when 
discriminatory burdens are imposed by law on certain minorities, or when a government policy 
systematically deprives some group of its livelihood” (AHR 553). In the case of the global poor’s 
lack of access to essential medicines, Pogge is concerned with this second kind of human rights 
violation, since the poor’s lack of access occurs through the social rules that govern the current 
pharmaceutical patent regime.  
 According to Pogge, human rights require that individuals have secure access to certain 
basic goods required for a “minimally worthwhile human life” (AHR 553). On his institutional 
understanding of human rights, individuals have claims on institutions to respect their right to 
these basic goods. Not only does this claim prohibit institutions from violating individual rights 
to the basic goods, it also requires that the rules governing society be designed in such a way that 
individuals have secure access to the basic goods—at least, to the extent that this is reasonably 
possible. It is up to governments to decide how to secure access to the basic goods, allowing for 
a wide variety of institutional schemes. The human right to secure access to the basic goods 
necessary for a minimally worthwhile human life applies on both the national and international 
level.2 “Any institutional design,” Pogge maintains, “is unjust if it foreseeably produces massive 
avoidable human rights deficits” (WPHR 25). 
Having specified a conception of human rights, Pogge then asks whether the current 
international rules governing the development and distribution of pharmaceuticals violate human 
                                               
2
 Unlike the national level, Pogge notes that it may be impossible on the international level to design institutions in 
such a way as to actually secure access to the objects of human rights. Given what we know about the interactions 
between states, Pogge explains, “it makes sense to require merely that the international order must be such that 
secure access can be fully realized” (AHR 554).  
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rights. With the adoption of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
Agreement in 1994, and subsequent TRIPS-plus provisions, the strong intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) of affluent Western countries were integrated into international trade law. Under 
TRIPS, the duration of pharmaceutical patent protection is twenty years, although patents 
typically have an “effective life” between ten and twelve years, as pharmaceutical companies 
tend to file for patents before clinical trials begin in order to secure the patent, protect against 
rival companies, and accelerate the review process (Muzaka 24-5). These new drugs are priced 
far beyond the reach of the poor to maximize profits for pharmaceutical companies during the 
twenty-year period of market-exclusivity, and to recuperate costs of research and development.3  
Rochelle Dreyfuss explains, “In effect, patents act as a tax, putting treatment beyond the 
reach of all but the richest of the world’s populace” (IGPH 36). Unable to afford many essential 
medicines, and without access to cheap generics, poor people lack access to the medicines they 
need—medicines that they likely would have had access to under the pre-TRIPS regime. Prior to 
the TRIPS Agreement, intellectual property rights were enforced on a state-by-state basis, with 
poor countries often having weak intellectual property protection (IPP), if any at all.4 As Pogge 
observes, the lack of secure access to essential medicines under TRIPS is a primary reason why 
                                               
3
 Pogge notes that, “When wealthy people really want a drug, then its price can be raised very high above the cost of 
production before increased gains from enlarging the mark-up are outweighed by losses from reduced sales volume. 
With patented medicines, mark-ups in excess of 1,000 per cent are not exceptional” (IGPH 139).  
4
 India is often cited as an example of the deleterious effects of TRIPS on the world’s poor. In India, the generic 
pharmaceutical industry was “one of the most successful in the world,” providing many of the global poor with the 
essential medicines they needed to survive (Muzaka 35). In an editorial from 2005—the year most developing 
countries were required to implement the new TRIPS patent rules for pharmaceuticals—The New York Times noted 
that the “thriving and sophisticated copycat drug industry” is about to come to an end: “India's government has 
issued rules that will effectively end the copycat industry for newer drugs. For the world's poor, this will be a double 
hit - cutting off the supply of affordable medicines and removing the generic competition that drives down the cost 
of brand-name drugs” (The New York Times, “India’s Choice”). 
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“nearly all of the avoidable mortality and morbidity occurs in poor countries and especially 
among their poorest inhabitants” (WPHR 223).  
According to Pogge, the current pharmaceutical patent regime violates the global poor’s 
human rights “by undermining their secure access to health and survival” (AHR 555). The global 
institutional order, especially international trade agreements like TRIPS, foreseeably and 
avoidably contributes to poor country governments being unable to secure and protect the human 
rights of their citizens. Moreover, there are realistic reforms to the status quo that could be 
implemented in order to avoid, or at least mitigate, the human rights violations caused by the 
current pharmaceutical patent regime. Several different reform plans have been proposed, 
including advance market commitments (AMCs), priority review vouchers (PRVs), and the 
Health Impact Fund. It is worth briefly examining AMCs and PRVs to see how these reform 
plans compare with the HIF.  
Advance market commitments incentivize the development of novel drugs by 
guaranteeing innovators that sponsors, such as governments or charitable organizations, will 
purchase vaccines developed to combat certain diseases. As Michael Ravvin explains, “An AMC 
would guarantee a predetermined price per treatment by supplementing the market price up to a 
certain number of treatments, on the condition that the treatments are sold at a fixed, affordable 
price” (118). Pharmaceutical innovators profit from AMCs not by charging a high price per drug 
as they do with the status quo, but by being the first innovator to develop a treatment for a 
disease identified by a sponsor. The sponsor’s commitment ensures that the innovator recoups 
costs of R&D and makes a profit, allowing the vaccine to remain available at an affordable price 
after the AMC has been fulfilled.  
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Priority review vouchers offer pharmaceutical innovators the opportunity to expedite the 
US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) review process. On the PRV model, “a pharmaceutical 
company that obtains approval for a drug or vaccine against a specified neglected disease will 
receive a voucher for priority FDA review of another pharmaceutical” (Ravvin 117). The 
average time for the FDA to review a drug is 18 months, but an innovator with a priority review 
voucher could cut FDA review time down to 6 months (ID 414). The extra year of market 
exclusivity afforded by the PRV is worth hundreds of millions of dollars in sales, so 
pharmaceutical innovators will be driven to develop medicines to treat the specified neglected 
diseases. In this way the PRV system benefits the global poor, but it also provides the wealthy 
with faster access to blockbuster drugs, as pharmaceutical companies will use their vouchers on 
drugs targeted at the developed world in order to maximize their profits.5  
The existence of viable reform plans shows that governments cannot appeal to the 
necessity of intellectual property as an incentive for pharmaceutical innovation. Although it is 
often claimed that patents provide pharmaceutical companies with necessary incentives to 
develop drugs that would otherwise not be profitable to produce, this is not necessarily the case. 
As Valbona Muzaka notes, “IPRs are not necessarily the only or even the most effective way of 
providing incentives for innovation and creativity” (22).6 Pogge concludes that a reform to the 
pharmaceutical patent regime, such as the HIF, “is morally required for the sake of realizing the 
human rights of the global poor” (AHR 556).  
                                               
5
 The European Commission defines a blockbuster medicine as “one which achieves annual revenues of over US $1 
billion at global level (17).  
6
 Muzaka elaborates, “Indeed, they may actually stifle innovation by reducing the incentives for IPRs holders to 
progress and compete in the market through other means, by making knowledge more expensive for others to use, or 
by unnecessarily reducing the pace of progress in general” (22-3). 
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Pogge favors the Health Impact Fund as a complement to the status quo because other 
reform plans, including AMCs and PRVs, have flaws that make them less effective at securing 
the basic human rights of the world’s poor. Advance market commitments may incentivize 
pharmaceutical innovation but, unlike the HIF, they do not offer a solution to the last mile 
problem. Sponsors encourage the development of new medicines, but they do not guarantee that 
a new drug will reach the people who need it, or that it will be properly used when distributed. 
Priority review vouchers share this flaw. PRVs provide innovators with the incentive to develop 
drugs specifically for neglected diseases, but they do not spur innovators to ensure that the global 
poor actually have access to them. The Health Impact Fund, on the other hand, promises both 
availability of and access to essential medicines for the global poor.  
There are also practical problems faced by AMCs and PRVs, which are not shared by the 
Health Impact Fund. For instance, AMCs require a high degree of specificity, which “is 
problematic because it presupposes the very knowledge whose acquisition is yet to be 
encouraged” (IGPH 194). Without this knowledge, sponsors are likely to be overly demanding or 
not demanding enough. Either the specifications are too rigorous, causing innovators to give up 
before developing the target drug, or they are not rigorous enough, allowing innovators to 
produce an inferior product that nevertheless meets the sponsor’s specifications. Although the 
HIF is not without obstacles to its implementation, Pogge maintains that they can be overcome, 
unlike some of the flaws in AMCs and PRVs.7   
 In the second stage of the human rights argument, Pogge explains and responds to three 
objections, each of which appeals to a morally relevant consideration meant to override the 
                                               
7
 For example, see Pogge’s, Peterson’s and Hollis’ response to Jorn Sonderholm’s critique of the HIF, “A Critique in 
Need of Critique,” in Public Health Ethics Vol. 3 No. 2, 2010: 178-185.  
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human rights argument. This paper will only focus on the last objection, the libertarian appeal to 
property rights, to which I now turn. 
 
IV. THE LIBERTARIAN APPEAL TO PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 Rooted in the Lockean tradition, the libertarian response to Pogge’s human rights 
argument “is characterized by the endorsement of strong rights to freedom and property” (AHR 
559). The libertarian advances two claims in response to Pogge. First, the libertarian argues that, 
on an appropriately narrow understanding of human rights, property owners who refuse to share 
what they own do not actively violate the human rights of poor people, even in the case of 
essential medicines. Second, the libertarian argues that human rights do not require affluent 
people to develop, or pay for the development of, medicines that the poor need to survive. In 
both cases, the libertarian maintains that no active violation of human rights occurs, and so the 
actions of the property owners and the affluent are morally permissible.8 In the next section, the 
libertarian’s first claim will be explained in detail. 
 
The Libertarian Argument 
 According to the libertarian, individuals have a strong right to private property. So long 
as they do not infringe on other individuals’ rights, property owners have the right to use their 
property as they see fit. They may share their property with others, but they also have the right to 
refuse to share their property, even in cases where other individuals require their property in 
order to satisfy human rights. Property owners also have the right to protect their property from 
                                               
8
 Of course, the libertarian acknowledges that, in both cases, no help is being given to the poor. But this is not a 
problem on a narrow conception of human rights, where the only requirement is to respect—i.e. not actively 
violate—human rights. 
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those who would try to claim it as their own, and to give others (e.g. the state) permission to 
protect it on their behalf. “In this way,” Pogge explains, “the creation and enforcement of legal 
property rights can be defended” (AHR 560). The libertarian maintains that these legal property 
rights in tangible objects also apply to intellectual property.9 Innovators, including 
pharmaceutical companies, have a right to refuse to share their innovations, including new 
essential medicines, with others. Moreover, they may take steps to protect their innovations, and 
the current pharmaceutical patent regime is one such method of protecting their intellectual 
property rights to the medicines they create.  
 Pogge is quick to note that, in the case of pharmaceuticals, this reasoning is circular. The 
TRIPS Agreement established international legal property rights that did not exist prior to the 
adoption of the agreement in 1994. “The creation of these new property rights,” explains Pogge, 
“cannot be defended by appeal to these same legal property rights” (AHR 560). The only way for 
the libertarian defense to succeed, according to Pogge, is to appeal to natural property rights. On 
this understanding, legal rights to property would have their basis in, and be justified by, a 
natural right to property, thereby avoiding the circularity problem faced by the previous 
articulation of the libertarian defense. Jorn Sonderholm notes that this natural property right 
allows libertarians to “see trade agreements such as TRIPS as a legitimate legal enforcement of a 
pre-existing natural/moral right” (EI 1111). 
 Pogge considers Robert Nozick, who has justified the exclusion of poor people from 
essential medicines, as an example of a libertarian appeal to natural property rights. On Nozick’s 
view, individuals have a natural right of appropriation. As Sonderholm explains, “This is the idea 
that any innovator/worker who mixes her labor with a previously unowned object or natural 
                                               
9
 Tom Palmer refers to this defense of intellectual property as the “piggy-back” theory, because “The intellectual 
property right obtains its moral force from its dependence on a more conventional right of property” (AP 820). 
13 
 
resource comes to own this object or resource in full and can legitimately deny that other people 
use/appropriate this object or resource” (EI 1111). The natural right of appropriation is limited 
by a proviso taken from Locke, which states that the appropriation of unowned resources is 
allowed provided that one leaves “enough and as good” for others.10 Exactly how to interpret the 
Lockean proviso is a subject of debate, but Nozick’s view represents one possible reading. In the 
case of pharmaceuticals, as Pogge notes, since producing drugs tends not to require many 
ingredients, the Lockean proviso is met on any reasonable interpretation.  
According to Nozick, a medical researcher who develops a new medicine that others need 
has a right to sell the medicine at whatever price he chooses, or to withhold the medicine from 
others altogether. Nozick reasons, “The others easily can possess the same materials he 
appropriated; the researcher’s appropriation or purchase of chemicals didn’t make those 
chemicals scarce in a way so as to violate the Lockean proviso” (181). The same holds for 
pharmaceutical corporations and the medicines they produce. In this case, the individuals 
employed by pharmaceutical corporations mix their labor with unowned resources to produce 
medicines. However, these individuals give up rights to their innovations through the contracts 
they sign with the pharmaceutical corporations by whom they are employed. So, like individuals, 
pharmaceutical corporations are entitled to the medicines they develop and produce, even though 
the human rights of the global poor remain unsatisfied as a result.  
 
V. POGGE’S RESPONSE TO THE LIBERTARIAN 
 Pogge argues that Nozick’s example of the medical researcher is not analogous to the 
current pharmaceutical patent regime. In Nozick’s example, pharmaceutical corporations would 
                                               
10
 It is worth noting that Locke did not actually defend intellectual property, although his theory of tangible property 
is often extended to intangibles (CF 3).   
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have a right to the physical medicines they develop and produce, provided that they do not 
violate the Lockean proviso. The difference between Nozick’s example and the current 
pharmaceutical patent regime, according to Pogge, is that “In the real world, innovators assert 
not merely physical property rights in product tokens they create, but also so-called intellectual 
property rights in abstract product types as well” (AHR 562).  
To illustrate, suppose an innovator creates a new medicine to treat tuberculosis. In 
addition to the physical property right to each pill she produces, under the current pharmaceutical 
patent regime, she may also claim a right not to have her innovation reproduced without her 
consent. The innovator’s intellectual property right acts as a constraint on others’ physical 
property rights in that it prevents them from using their own property in certain ways. 
Specifically, the innovator’s intellectual property rights prevent others from using their resources 
to reproduce the exact same tuberculosis medicine she created. So, if the innovator’s tuberculosis 
medicine is composed solely of ingredients XYZ, then no other individuals may use their own 
ingredients XYZ to duplicate the IP protected product.11 For the duration of her patent, the 
innovator has the sole right to produce and sell tuberculosis medicines composed of XYZ.  
 However, as the above example makes clear, intellectual property rights appear 
inconsistent with libertarianism. On the one hand, the libertarian endorses strong rights to 
freedom and property. But on the other hand, the innovator’s intellectual property rights restrict 
the physical property rights and freedom of others by preventing them from using their own 
property as they see fit. According to Pogge, this inconsistency leads to a “surprising 
conclusion,” namely that “Libertarian thought does not merely fail to vindicate intellectual 
                                               
11
 The innovator may also have exclusive rights to the process she used to create her tuberculosis medicine. 
Typically, innovators file for and receive process patents, which protect the means by which an innovation is 
produced, in addition to product patents that protect the composition of the innovation itself (Muzaka 25). 
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property rights but actually condemns them” (AHR 564). If Pogge is right, then any intellectual 
property regime is incompatible with libertarianism.   
 
VI. CRITIQUE OF POGGE 
 Pogge’s response poses a serious problem for the libertarian defender of intellectual 
property. As Sonderholm explains,  
If Pogge is right that the libertarian argument in favor of IPRs can only yield the 
conclusion that innovators have property rights to the physical token of their 
innovation, then libertarians seem to be committed to the view that an author has 
only a property right to the physical token of the book she is writing and not any 
copies of it. (EI 1114) 
Presumably, many libertarians would find Pogge’s conclusion unpalatable. To maintain that an 
author does not own the idea for her story, but merely the physical pages on which it is written, 
seems counterintuitive and, prima facie, absurd. Something is wrong with this picture—either 
libertarianism has gone astray, or Pogge’s human rights argument rests on a misunderstanding.  
In what follows, I identify the flaw in Pogge’s argument with his failure to distinguish 
between status quo and revisionist libertarian positions on intellectual property. Since Pogge 
does not distinguish between these two libertarian positions, his critique of libertarianism leads 
to his counterintuitive conclusion that intellectual property rights of any kind, including the 
author’s right to her story, are incompatible with libertarianism.    
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The Status Quo Libertarian 
According to the status quo libertarian, the current system of international IPP is entailed 
by strong natural rights to private property. Pogge is right to reject this version of libertarianism. 
However, the ground on which Pogge rejects the status quo libertarian is flawed—libertarian 
accounts are not necessarily inconsistent with intellectual property rights. The reason to reject the 
status quo libertarian is because she conflates a natural right to intellectual property with current 
IP laws, when the two are not the same thing. To illustrate this point, consider the history of the 
current system of international IPP, which goes far beyond what a commitment to IPRs requires.  
Even if we grant that the libertarian’s endorsement of strong natural property rights can 
be extended to intangibles—a position that the status quo libertarian maintains, but that many 
libertarians today do not hold—it does not seem like the current system of IPP is necessarily 
entailed by strong natural property rights.12 For instance, James V. Delong explains that some 
libertarian skeptics “would not allow a creator to invoke the legal power of the state to exclude 
others from using his creation…Their objection is not so much to the idea of intellectual property 
as it is to the use of state power to enforce it” (CF 17). International intellectual property 
protection, after all, was not universally mandated and enforced until TRIPS, and the natural 
rights defense of IPRs can be traced back far earlier.13  
                                               
12
 Stephan Kinsella elaborates: “Libertarian views on IP range from complete support of the fullest gamut of IP 
imaginable, to outright opposition to IP rights” (8). Kinsella himself, for instance, argues against intellectual 
property, whereas Randian libertarians appeal to natural rights to defend IPRs. While all libertarians emphasize the 
importance of property rights, their position on IPRs—and even the content of intellectual property itself—
dramatically varies.  
13
 For example, see Lysander Spooner’s The Law of Intellectual Property: or An Essay on the Right of Authors and 
Inventors to a Perpetual Property in Their Ideas” (1855). Spooner gives a natural rights defense of intellectual 
property, and this text marks the first time the term ‘intellectual property’ was used in print (May and Sell 18). An 
anarchist, Spooner argued that the government’s sole economic function should be “to protect the rights of each and 
every individual to acquire all that he can acquire and to dispose completely at his own volition of whatever property 
he may have acquired” (Blau 254).   
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The historical origins of intellectual property rights make it clear that a natural rights 
defense of intellectual property is distinct from, and does not entail, the current legal means of 
securing IPP. Tom Palmer explains that, “Monopoly privilege and censorship lie at the historical 
root of patent and copyright” (IP 264). For example, the stringency of American IP law, which 
undoubtedly had a significant impact on how TRIPS was formulated, can be traced back to the 
English system of intellectual property protection. Under the English system, “Patents for new 
inventions were issued by the English Crown with the aim of raising funds through the granting 
of monopolies or of securing control over industries perceived to be of political importance” (IP 
264). Today, patents still function as monopolistic privileges, although they are rarely described 
in such terms. The political importance of patents was the chief reason that industrialized 
countries instituted patent systems during the nineteenth century. As Peter Dietsch explains, “In 
an increasingly protectionist international climate, patents were seen as a safeguard against 
foreign competition” (IPTJ 232).  
The strong IPP of international intellectual property law is not entailed by the status quo 
libertarian’s natural rights defense of IP. It is the result, not of logical deduction from the 
libertarian idea of a natural right to property, but rather the product of political lobbying by 
developed countries such as the United States and members of the European Union, who pushed 
for strong international IPP during the Uruguay Round. The tension that Pogge identifies 
between libertarianism and intellectual property is a direct result of how the current international 
intellectual property laws are defined, implemented, and enforced—not an inherent feature of 
libertarianism. Libertarians need not defend or endorse the current pharmaceutical patent regime. 
In fact, a libertarian is likely to agree with Pogge that the status quo is unjust. But a libertarian 
would not accept Pogge’s normative principles. Instead of maintaining that the status quo is 
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unjust on the basis of human rights deprivations, a libertarian could argue that the current 
pharmaceutical patent regime is unjust because it infringes on individuals’ natural rights to 
property and on their freedom.  
 
The Revisionist Libertarian 
The tension between strong physical property rights and intellectual property rights is a 
legitimate concern for libertarians, and perhaps it is this tension that has caused many libertarians 
to abandon the pro-IP ship. However, this tension is not, in and of itself, enough to show that 
libertarianism is necessarily inconsistent with intellectual property rights. Contrary to what 
Pogge argues, the tension between a strong natural right to tangible property and intellectual 
property protection only shows one thing: that intellectual property rights, in any form that 
allows innovators control over all physical tokens of their innovation type, are inconsistent with 
libertarianism. And this view, as noted above, is only a problem for the status quo libertarian. 
The revisionist libertarian, on the other hand, proposes an alternative system of IPP that is 
consistent with the libertarian values of freedom and rights to tangible property. 
Jonathan Trerise argues in favor of a system of IPP called Weak-Type Protection (WTP). 
He explains WTP as “the view that one has ownership over one’s original token(s), as well as a 
claim right on the rivalrous uses of copies of one’s original token(s)” (IPTJ 124). Trerise 
maintains that a WTP system of intellectual property protection is preferable to Strong-Type 
Protection systems, like the current pharmaceutical patent regime, which he believes are 
unjustified because of their infringements on individual liberty. A rivalrous use of an object 
occurs when someone uses the object such that the availability or value of the object to another 
person is reduced. For instance, my use of an acre of land is rivalrous because it prevents others 
19 
 
from using that land. However, my use of the wind to fly a kite is non-rivalrous, since others 
may use the same resource for their own purposes. The advantage of WTP is twofold:  
WTP allows one to own ideas in that others are not free to copy and profit from 
those copies, thereby impacting your ability to make a profit. WTP also does not, 
in contrast to STP, restrict one’s ability to make independent and yet qualitatively 
identical items; that is, WTP regards the causal history of putative copies as 
relevant to determining their status as ownables. (IPTJ 124) 
In the case of pharmaceuticals, a WTP system of intellectual property protection allows 
pharmaceutical innovators to profit from their innovations, as they retain weak-type rights over 
their innovations. However, a WTP system does not absolutely prohibit others from making and 
using copies of the innovation. Innovators who independently arrive at the same innovation have 
no claim against one another under a WTP system. 
 A WTP system of intellectual property is, I maintain, an example of a system of IPP that 
can be endorsed by the revisionist libertarian. Under a WTP system, if I were to invent a vaccine 
for Chagas disease, I would have intellectual property rights to this vaccine type, as well as 
physical property rights to each vaccine token I produced. However, I would be unable to 
prevent others from producing, owning, and using their own vaccine tokens for Chagas disease, 
even if they directly copied my vaccine. The only restriction I could place on others would be to 
prohibit rivalrous uses of their tokens of my Chagas disease vaccine. Primarily, this restriction 
would prohibit others from directly copying (e.g. through reverse engineering) and selling my 
vaccine, since that would reduce the value of my vaccine. But it would not prohibit an individual 
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from selling the Chagas disease vaccine she created independent of my vaccine, even if the two 
were identical.14  
One might argue that anyone who uses their own tokens of my Chagas disease vaccine, 
for whatever reason, is subject to the rivalrous use restriction. For instance, if Susan directly 
copies my Chagas disease vaccine type and stores a token of it in her medicine cabinet, in the 
event that she may need it someday, Susan has deprived me of a potential sale. Worse still, 
Susan’s ingenuity may inspire others to do the same, costing me more sales over time. But if 
that’s the case, then either the availability or value of my own Chagas disease tokens would have 
to be reduced, according to Trerise’s definition of rivalrous use. In the case of medicines, it 
seems unlikely that Susan’s production of Chagas disease vaccine tokens would reduce the 
availability of my Chagas disease vaccine tokens. Since medicines typically meet the Lockean 
proviso, there ought to be enough resources for both of us to produce our own Chagas disease 
vaccine tokens, even if we both produce them in large quantities.  
But does Susan’s production of Chagas disease vaccines reduce the value of my own 
Chagas disease tokens? The answer to this question depends on what Susan does with her 
Chagas disease vaccine tokens. If she gives them away in large quantities or sells them for less 
than I do, then she reduces the value of my vaccine tokens by flooding the market with free or 
cheap Chagas disease vaccines, thereby forcing me to sell my vaccine tokens at a lower price. 
Both of these uses are rivalrous on Trerise’s account. But if she merely produces Chagas disease 
vaccine tokens for her own personal use, then it is hard to see how she has significantly reduced 
                                               
14
 Although such instances are likely to be uncommon, a clear definition of “independent creation” would need to be 
established in order to put a WTP system into practice. A starting point might be something like the following: for 
any two similar innovations X and Y, X was created independently of Y if and only if a) X’s creator did not directly 
copy Y or Y’s production process (e.g. by reverse engineering), b) X’s creator did not knowingly incorporate 
elements of Y into X (e.g. by copying Y’s design or using the same materials), and/or c) X was unaware of Y’s 
existence. 
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the value of my own vaccine tokens. Although she is not buying my vaccines, her personal 
production and use does not significantly reduce the price at which I can sell my Chagas disease 
vaccine tokens to other people, because aggregate demand is only diminished by a small degree. 
Even if she inspires others to do the same, the specialized equipment and knowledge required to 
produce pharmaceuticals creates a technological fence that prevents most individuals from 
following in her footsteps. So in this case, it seems like her use is non-rivalrous.15  
Furthermore, on a WTP system I would have no claim against someone who, inspired by 
my Chagas disease vaccine, created and sold her own vaccine type, even if it bore a striking 
similarity to my vaccine. Instances of “creative inspiration,” as Trerise notes, would be the most 
difficult kind of case for WTP to handle. It does not seem that this difficulty would prove 
insurmountable, though, since the current international IPP regime is far more complicated than 
a WTP system, and it manages to deal with similar difficulties. Although I would not have a 
right to market-exclusivity under a WTP system, I would still have intellectual property rights to 
my vaccine type, since I mixed my labor with materials I fairly appropriated.16 Of course, a WTP 
system like Trerise’s would need to be fleshed out in considerable detail before being 
implemented in the real world, but this brief sketch is enough to show how such a system would 
operate, and to prove that libertarianism can generate intellectual property rights and endorse 
strong natural rights to physical property. 
                                               
15
 Although I have tried to distinguish these two cases, one may respond that Susan’s use of her Chagas disease 
vaccines in the latter case does in fact constitute a rivalrous use of my original token on Trerise’s account. I do not 
have room to fully consider such a response here, but it is sufficient to note that a robust account of rivalrous usage 
would be required for a WTP system to be implemented in the real world.   
16
 This weak-type IPR would allow me to recoup the costs of my research and development and, like physical 
property, I would presumably have the right to sell the patent to my Chagas disease vaccine to another person, 
although Trerise does not specifically address this topic.   
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The freedom this system allows would have a significant impact on the world’s poor. 
Under a WTP system, non-governmental organizations would be permitted to produce and 
distribute essential medicines to the poor, so long as they did not impact the ability of 
pharmaceutical corporations to make a profit. To avoid taking profits from patentees, NGOs 
might, for example, require recipients of medicines under patent to prove that they are unable to 
pay the market price for medicines. With increased access to essential medicines, the global poor 
would enjoy greater human rights protection under a WTP system than under the status quo. So 
by Pogge’s own normative principles, a WTP system of intellectual property is a plausible 
alternative to the Health Impact Fund.  
 
VII. OBJECTIONS 
In what follows, I will anticipate two objections to the system of IPP that I describe. First, 
Pogge may press on my claim that a WTP system of intellectual property protection is consistent 
with libertarianism. Second, pharmaceutical corporations and other defenders of the current 
international IP regime may argue that a WTP system would encourage less innovation than the 
status quo. Since less innovation would result in fewer new medicines being brought to market 
each year, a WTP system would be worse than the status quo and should not be implemented. 
Although Pogge is unlikely to make this second objection, it is important to respond to it here to 
show that the WTP system is a viable system of IPP. 
 
Pogge’s Inconsistency Objection 
 Pogge may make the following challenge in response to the WTP system I have 
presented. He might argue that, even though a WTP system violates individual rights to freedom 
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and property much less than the current intellectual property regime, such a system is still 
inconsistent with libertarianism. Under a WTP system, an innovator has claims against rivalrous 
uses of her innovation type, which means that she is able to prohibit other individuals from doing 
certain things with their own property. The original question Pogge poses to the libertarian—how 
can innovators have the right to unilaterally prohibit others from using their own property in 
certain ways within a libertarian framework?—could be posed to libertarians who endorse a 
WTP system as well. It is not possible, according to Pogge, for libertarians to both endorse 
strong physical property rights and support a WTP system of intellectual property protection, 
under which innovators have limited control over the property of others. Any such unilateral 
limitation on individual rights to freedom and property is enough to show that libertarianism is 
inconsistent with intellectual property rights.  
 In responding to this objection, it is crucial to keep in mind that the libertarian does not 
endorse absolute, unrestricted individual property rights. If the libertarian defended absolute 
property rights, she would be committed to the claim that any limitation of one’s property rights 
is unjust. However, the libertarian recognizes that an individual’s right to property can be 
restricted under certain circumstances. The following two cases serve to illustrate this point. 
One situation in which the libertarian recognizes limitations on property rights occurs 
when an individual’s property rights conflict with or violate the rights of another person. For 
instance, my property right to my collection of baseball cards is limited by the fact that I cannot 
store them in my neighbor’s house without his permission. My neighbor has the right to permit 
or deny entry to visitors, to decorate the house as he sees fit, and to decide what objects go inside 
his house, among other things. To move my baseball card collection into his house without 
authorization would violate my neighbor’s property rights, since owning his house makes him 
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the sole arbiter of how it is used. In this case, the libertarian would not say that my property 
rights are being unjustly restricted, as we would expect if the libertarian endorsed absolute, 
unrestricted rights to property. Rather, my property rights simply do not extend so far as to allow 
me to transgress my neighbor’s rights to freedom and property. My neighbor’s property rights, in 
other words, trump my own. 
The libertarian also recognizes that property rights can be limited, to a certain extent, 
through contract.17 In exchange for a monthly rate of pay, my neighbor may allow me to store 
my baseball card collection in his house for one year. In such a case, he would be unable to do 
certain things with his property for the duration of the contract, like sell his house without 
providing that the new owner honor the contract with me. Moreover, the contract may give me 
certain rights to his property—for example, the right to enter his house without permission to 
check on my card collection—that I would not normally possess. As in the previous case, the 
libertarian does not view this restriction of rights as unjust. The rights to contract and freedom 
allow my neighbor to accept a limitation of his property rights in exchange for a monthly 
payment.  
What these two examples show is that the libertarian’s endorsement of strong property 
rights does not preclude certain limitations from being placed on an individual’s right to 
property. That being the case, it is unclear to me why we ought to think that the libertarian 
framework is inconsistent with the limited restrictions to property rights that a WTP system 
requires. The revisionist libertarian may offer two responses to Pogge, in keeping with the two 
cases considered above. First, she may argue that the rights of innovators trump those of other 
                                               
17
 According to some libertarians, one cannot permanently give up one’s right to property through contract. Less 
severe limitations, like forfeiting the right to one’s innovation through a contract with one’s employer, are 
permissible within a libertarian framework. 
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individuals. So, when an innovator prohibits others from doing certain things with their own 
property, no rights are being unjustly restricted. Second, she may argue that individuals can 
accept the limited property restrictions that a WTP system places on them, in voluntary exchange 
for intellectual property protection and the benefits that IPP brings. It seems likely that the global 
poor would consent to a WTP system of intellectual property, given the increased access to 
essential medicines it would afford them. As discussed in the next section, there is reason to 
think that weaker IPP would allow for more innovation, leading to new and improved medicines 
and possibly higher profits for pharmaceutical corporations. Increased innovation and the 
availability of new medicines would give the rich reason to accept a WTP system as well.  
 
Decreased Innovation  
In order to be compatible with libertarian property rights, any system of intellectual 
property protection must be significantly weaker than the status quo. But any system of IPP that 
is significantly weaker than the status quo, some might argue, would provide pharmaceutical 
corporations with less incentive to innovate. Pharmaceutical corporations will be reluctant to 
research and develop new medicines without the tremendous financial benefits secured through 
strong IPP. Since a WTP system would have the undesirable effect of encouraging less 
innovation, it is not a viable alternative to the status quo.   
If this second objection is successful, my response to Pogge would lose some of its force. 
If a WTP system is not an alternative to the status quo, we might wonder why the revisionist 
libertarian would endorse it. In other words, the revisionist libertarian wants a system of IPP that 
is both consistent with libertarian principles and capable of being realized at the global level. If a 
WTP system cannot be implemented in the real world, then the revisionist libertarian is under 
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pressure to devise an alternative IPP scheme that is feasible. In what follows, I will respond to 
this objection. 
Defenders of the status quo often claim that strong intellectual property protection is 
necessary in order to promote innovation, but we ought to treat such claims with suspicion. The 
empirical support for the necessity of strong IPRs for innovation is dubious at best, and 
altogether lacking at worst. It is also unclear whether this alleged increase in innovation leads to 
an overall increase in wealth.18 As Palmer explains, “That markets for ideal objects can and do 
function in the absence of enforceable intellectual property rights is demonstrated by the fact that 
many innovations that are not accorded copyright or patent protection are nevertheless produced 
on the market” (IP 287). Alternatives to strong IPP, such as technological fences and contractual 
agreements, can be used to prevent intellectual property from rivalrous use and promote 
innovation.  
To illustrate, consider that although article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement states that 
member states may exclude from patentability surgical methods for treating humans, there is still 
incentive to develop new methods for surgery on humans and animals (WTO 331). Hospitals and 
universities have incentive to develop new surgical techniques, despite lacking guaranteed patent 
protection, because such techniques are useful. The advanced medical equipment and training 
required to perform surgery serve as obstacles to the widespread dissemination and subsequent 
loss of value of surgical techniques. Industries like fashion and advertising also lack strong IPP, 
but continue to innovate through other means. With this in mind, we might ask whether strong 
IPRs are necessary for pharmaceutical innovation in particular.  
                                               
18
 Kinsella, in response to this utilitarian line of thinking, points out that “Econometric studies [of patents and 
copyrights] do not conclusively show net gains in wealth” (14).  
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If it were true that strong IPRs are necessary for pharmaceutical innovation, we would 
expect the number of innovative drugs on the market to rise as the strength of IPP increases. In 
reality, we find the opposite—intellectual property protection has increased over the past few 
decades, yet the number of new molecular entities reaching the world market has steadily 
declined since the 1960s (Muzaka 26). Sigrid Sterckx offers one explanation for this decline in 
innovation: “the greater part of pharmaceutical R&D budgets is spent on ‘me-too’ drugs—drugs 
that are slightly altered (and hence not innovative) versions of existing success products” (181). 
By focusing on “me-too” drugs, pharmaceutical corporations can create and enforce patent 
monopolies for a profit.19  
Some scholars even argue that strong IPP actually suppresses innovation. Jillian Cohen 
and Patricia Illingworth, for example, maintain that “Patents impede progress in technology by 
precluding other firms from cross-learning and building on the original innovation” (32). 
Moreover, many pharmaceutical corporations pursue patents for the sole purpose of impeding 
competitors’ innovative efforts. These so-called patent thickets are “multiple and overlapping 
patent rights that require those seeking to commercialize new technology to obtain licenses from 
multiple patent holders” (May and Sell 26). Patent thickets discourage innovation by increasing 
the cost of pharmaceutical R&D, which exceeds $65 billion per year in the US alone (Merges 
283). So, claims about the necessity of strong IPRs for pharmaceutical innovation ought to be 
treated with skepticism.  
 
 
 
                                               
19
 Pharmaceutical corporations, on the other hand, maintain that the decline in pharmaceutical innovation can be 
attributed to the fact that most of the obvious new molecular entities having already been discovered.   
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
 This paper has identified the flaw in Pogge’s human rights argument with his failure to 
distinguish status quo and revisionist libertarianism. Although Pogge rejects status quo 
libertarianism, he does so for the wrong reasons. Consequently, Pogge arrives at the 
counterintuitive conclusion that libertarianism is necessarily inconsistent with intellectual 
property rights of any kind. But, as the revisionist libertarian position shows, it is a mistake to 
maintain that libertarians cannot generate IPRs and endorse strong natural rights to property, as a 
WTP system of intellectual property shows that the libertarian values of freedom and property 
are not necessarily inconsistent with IPRs. The WTP system, I maintain, is a libertarian 
alternative to Pogge’s Health Impact Fund. Pogge has considered and rejected other reform 
plans, including advance market commitments and priority review vouchers, but he has not 
addressed the possibility of a WTP system. In order for his HIF proposal to move forward, Pogge 
must offer a response to the revisionist libertarian.  
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